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Abstract
The speculation that public spending may shift as the age composition changes in the United States raises
questions regarding the sustainability of government programs. This paper addresses this issue by examining
how age demographics alter a county government’s spending on public goods and its sources (local taxes or
intergovernmental transfers from the state and/or federal level) for funding these expenditures. Building on
an existing model, this study finds that it is not enough to simply examine this question with cross-sectional
analysis, suggesting that time and county fixed effects need to be considered to address consequences from the
Tiebout bias. The results report that the consequences of age composition vary according to the spillover and
cost dimensions of each public good. However, these changes are rendered benign as revenues shift in a
similar manner as spending, which eliminates potential imbalances within county governments.
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1. Introduction 
The United States’ demographic is transforming dramatically due to changing patterns in 
fertility and mortality.  The Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration (OASSA) 
reports that life expectancies at birth are expected to increase from 73.0 years for men and 79.2 
years for women in 1996 to 82.4 and 85.6 years, respectively, in 2080. At the same time, fertility 
is decreasing, as indicated by the percentage of childless women rising from 35.1 percent in 1976 
to 45.1 percent in 2006. Declining fertility and rising life expectancy contribute to an older U.S. 
demographic. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the proportion of the United States’ 
population over 65 years of age is projected to increase from 12.4 percent in 2000 to 20.7 percent 
in 2050. Lee and Tuljapurkar (2001) indicate that the elderly dependency ratio will peak at 
around 41 percent to 45 percent in the decade from 2030 to 2040. The demographic makeup of 
the United States will undergo a dramatic restructuring according to these projections. In order to 
plan for these changes, it is important to study the effects of demographic transformation, 
especially the effects of aging demographics on public expenditures and revenues.    
As constituent demographics shift, governments face the possibility of changing public 
support for expenditures and the funding problems that may arise. A possible relationship 
between demographics and spending is characterized in a median voter framework. One scenario 
using the median voter framework is called the selfish choice model (Cutler, Elmendorf, and 
Zeckhauser, 1993). According to Becker (1983), individuals identify with groups defined by 
commonalities such as occupation, industry, income, geography, and age. These groups use 
political influence to improve the well-being of members. Competition among these political 
groups determines the equilibrium structure of taxes, subsidies, and spending. Assuming that the 
majority determines the outcome of voting, an aging demographic changes the identity of the 
median voter to its desired level of spending and/or tax revenues (Cutler et al., 1993).     
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 The occurrence of spillovers is another argument for a correlation between age 
demographics and public expenditures in the selfish choice model. Spillovers are created when 
the benefits of publicly funded services are enjoyed by nonresidents or when a community 
invests in those who leave the jurisdiction before returns are realized (MaCurdy and Nechyba, 
2001). For instance, a spillover is generated when a community funds the education of children 
who move away before the community realizes returns on its investment. Spillovers are a 
concern because they are a fiscal burden on communities. Funding problems for public programs 
arise as a result of these fiscal burdens. Fiscal burdens can be lowered according to the selfish 
choice model. For example, in a community with a large elderly population, the identity of the 
median voter has a spending agenda closer to that of the elderly population. The elderly 
population only wants a small portion of local tax revenues to be allocated to spending for 
education since large fiscal burdens come about as a result of the high likelihood that the elderly 
will not realize returns on this particular investment due to their advanced age and/or a lack of 
children that could benefit from education spending.  
Cutler et al. also describe a second model involving the median voter framework called 
the community preference model. In this model, people care about the welfare of other people 
living in their community, which means an individual’s spending preferences alter as community 
demographics change. For example, if there are more children in a community, the elderly 
population would desire to spend more money on education because they care about the children 
in their community. Thus, the identity of the median voter changes so taxes are increased to fund 
education expenditures.                                                                                                                                                                                 
 Much of the empirical work on the effects of aging demographics is narrow. The 
literature tends to focus on individual expenditure categories and the corresponding federal or 
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 state grant program. Studies of this nature include work such as that of Poterba (1997), Harris, 
Evans, and Schwab (2001), and Ladd and Murray (2001) on education spending. However, one 
exception in this trend is presented in a study by MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001). In their paper, 
they analyze the impact of demographic factors on five different expenditure categories of a local 
government, i.e. the 58 counties of California, in 1990. To do this, they regress each expenditure 
category on a number of demographic variables. In addition, they examine how aging 
demographics affect intergovernmental transfers from the state and federal governments and 
local tax revenues of these county governments to understand the ability of counties to fund 
expenditures. This is done by regressing each revenue type on demographic variables. By using 
this method, the issue of fungibility1 that has been neglected in previous research is addressed. 
From their work, MaCurdy and Nechyba answer the question: How does a change in the age 
composition of a county’s population alter a local government’s spending on public goods and 
on its sources (local taxes or state/federal) for funding these expenditures?  
The goal of this paper is to answer the same question as that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. 
However, I deviate from their investigation in two ways. The first way is by examining all 
counties in the 48 continental United States instead of focusing solely on Californian counties. 
Secondly, I modify their study by using a panel data set to account for county specific factors 
and time fixed effects. This method is commonly utilized in research examining the effects of 
demographic change on public education spending such as that of Poterba (1997), Harris et al. 
(2001), and Ladd and Murray (2001). In deviating from MaCurdy and Nechyba’s method, there 
is evidence that their results do not hold in different time periods, with added county and time 
fixed effects, and when the study is extended to the rest of the United States. This leads me to 
                                                          
1
 Fungibility refers to the ability of spending on public goods to be freely exchangeable or replaceable by 
substitution. 
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 conclude that the Tiebout bias, the idea that people vote with their feet, does play a significant 
role in expenditures and revenues.2 However, a common thread was found in both this study and 
that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. In all the different data sets used, the results suggest that, though 
expenditures in a county may rise, a corresponding rise in revenues do adjust to compensate; thus 
the shifts in expenditures that may be caused by age composition are rendered harmless for 
county governments since revenues tend to shift in a similar manner.    
The remainder of this paper has the following organization. Section 2 describes and 
analyzes the work of MaCurdy and Nechyba. Section 3 contains the presentation and 
examination of my proposed method. Section 4 discusses replication of MaCurdy and Nechyba’s 
work on California counties in 1990, including the data, empirical specification, regression 
results, and implications of findings. Section 5 examines California counties using 1990, 2000, 
and panel data sets. Section 6 then extends the study to the rest of the United States. The results 
of this study and an analysis of the consequences of the change in methodology are presented in 
Section 7. The final section of this paper contains the summary and conclusion. 
 
2. A discussion of MaCurdy and Nechyba 
In their study, MaCurdy and Nechyba empirically and theoretically investigate how 
“demographic decomposition affects the fiscal burden of communities and the extent to which 
centralized governments can correct for under-provision of goods with positive spillover that 
may occur at the local level” (Wilson, 2002). Their study is significant in that it introduces a new 
approach in studying public expenditures. In a majority of studies examining demographics and 
government spending, the focus has typically been aimed at individual expenditure categories, 
such as education, and the corresponding federal or state grant program. MaCurdy and Nechyba 
                                                          
2
 See Section 3 for explanation of Tiebout bias. 
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 analyze the impact of demographic factors on intergovernmental transfers (transfers from the 
federal and state governments to counties), local tax revenues, and five expenditure categories 
that include: education, health, welfare, police and fire protection, and infrastructure. By using 
this method, the issue of fungibility that has been neglected in previous research is addressed. 
For example, earlier studies did not take into account the budget decisions a local government 
makes when it receives a grant from the federal government for school supplies. This local 
government is able to allocate a smaller amount of funding for education expenditures and raise 
spending for an entirely different expenditure such as the fire department. MaCurdy and 
Nechyba’s method is helpful in making transparent such movements and transfers within federal 
and local government spending for different expenditure categories.  
MaCurdy and Nechyba’s work is a good basis for the study of aging demographics 
because their methods are consistent with previous work. Specifically, MaCurdy and Nechyba’s 
use of county-level data is in keeping with the discussion between Poterba (1997) and Ladd and 
Murray (2001). Poterba examines a panel set of data in an empirical study to understand the 
relationship between the level of per child education spending and a number of demographic 
variables including the portion of the population over 65 years old, the portion of the population 
of school age children (5 to 17 years old), the fraction of the state’s population living below the 
poverty line or in urban areas, and the fraction of the population that is not white.  He uses a 
panel of state-level data for the 48 contiguous states from 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991 to regress 
the logarithm of per child education spending onto the logarithm of demographic variables with 
state and time fixed effects.  
Poterba’s study lays the foundation for additional studies on the effect of an aging 
demographic structure on public education spending. Ladd and Murray replicate his research, but 
5
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 modify it by examining a different level of data. They use a panel of county level data of the 48 
contiguous states for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990 instead of state level data. They argue that 
the use of state level data provides a limited view of the effects of aging on education spending. 
State level data ignores differences across communities within states, differences that affect both 
the location decisions of the elderly and spending on education. Another motivation for using 
county level data is due to the fact that local governments raise a significant share of total 
revenue. In 1995-1996, local government accounted for 46 percent of the total revenues, the state 
government 47 percent, and the federal government provided 7 percent (Ladd and Murray, 2001). 
Furthermore, in 20 states, the local share exceeded that of the state (Ladd and Hansen, 1999). 
The use of county level data seems to be the best choice to provide the most visibility in this 
discussion. 
MaCurdy and Nechyba’s inclusion of five different expenditure categories rather than 
just one category is also consistent with Bogart (1991)’s research. In his study, Bogart 
investigates the consequences of omitting quasi-governmental expenditures when estimating the 
demand for local public services. These quasi-governmental expenditures include fire protection 
and public works such as streets, drainage, sewers, sewage processing, garbage and trash 
disposal, and public buildings and grounds. Bogart argues that these quasi-expenditures should 
be included in expenditure analysis because they contribute to the variance in the spending 
between states due to a wide range of spending in public works and fire protection from one 
community to another. Bogart finds evidence of this in his inspection of public works and fire 
protection expenditures from 179 New Jersey municipalities in 1980. Within the data set, the 
median per capita public works spending ranges from $60 to $85, a 42 percent difference in 
expenditures. Additionally, spending on fire protection in communities can vary great due to the 
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 structure of their fire protection forces. A community can have a force that consists of all 
volunteers or, at the other extreme, all paid full-time fire fighters. Bogart finds evidence of biases 
that arise in studying how aging demographics affect expenditures due to ignoring these quasi-
governmental expenditures. Bogart’s study confirms that it is important to include a full 
accounting of public expenses.  
MaCurdy and Nechyba’s work also includes an examination of county governments’ 
intergovernmental revenues from the state and/or federal government. By studying the flow of 
intergovernmental revenues, MaCurdy and Nechyba adhere to the fiscal federalism model. In 
fiscal federalism, several layers of government co-exist with different expenditure programs and 
responsibilities are assigned to different levels of government. This method is in keeping with 
studies from Echevarria (1995) and Seitz (2007). Echevarria starts with the hypothesis that 
different ages demand different kinds of public goods and services. This means there are some 
expenditure items that are mainly aimed at satisfying the needs of individuals within a specific 
age range and there are some that support programs that are independent of age. From there, he 
creates a model with two levels of government, one regional and one national, and three groups 
of population according to the age of members. This model is useful because it is designed to 
analyze the consequences of population growth and how changes in the age structure impose on 
the relative needs of different levels of governments in a fiscal policy setup. Echevarria argues 
that a fiscal federalism model is helpful in evaluating the sustainability of the current allocation 
of responsibilities for funding expenditures among different levels of government as 
demographics are projected to change. Echevarria’s work points out that more than one layer of 
government exist. The use of a fiscal federalism model is valuable in understanding how 
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 different layers of government interact with one another to provide for the changing needs of 
people as the age structure of a population fluctuates.  
Seitz (2007) scrutinizes the effects of demographic change on federal, state, and local 
government expenditures in Germany to learn whether or not demographic change will induce 
expenditure imbalances among the different levels of government. From his work, Seitz reports 
that changes in demographic will produce significant vertical expenditure imbalances between 
the federal and subnational (state and local) governments in addition to imbalances within the 
state and local governments. Unfortunately, Seitz only examines expenditures and ignores the 
sources – revenues – that finance these expenditures. Discussion of the sustainability of 
government spending is missing in the work; however, MaCurdy and Nechyba’s study of 
revenues fills in this gap and allows them to answer the question of sustainability. 
MaCurdy and Nechyba create a model of fiscal federalism to examine how expenditure 
categories, with different types of spillovers, are funded by a community’s government. In their 
model, MaCurdy and Nechyba define three different types of spillovers: 1) across communities 
within the current time period, 2) within the community but across time, and 3) across 
communities and across time. They use a budget constraint for a community’s government, 
which incorporates tax competition and tax exporting. They also create a public-good cost 
function for different types of public goods for a community’s government. In their set-up public 
goods are described along two dimensions. The first dimension is the type of spillovers the good 
generates. There are four different types of public goods in terms of spillovers. These stylized 
public goods include: g1 is a pure local consumption good with no interregional or 
intergenerational spillovers such as a local park; g2 refers to a pure local investment good with 
intergenerational but no interregional spillovers such as local infrastructure; g3 represents an 
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 investment with interjurisdictional spillovers such as education; and g4 corresponds to a good 
with only interjurisdictional consumption spillovers such as pollution control. The second 
dimension of public goods is cost. Goods of type c1, c2, and c3 are targeted solely at the young, 
middle-aged, and elderly constituents, respectively. The following table summarizes the 
predictions for funding of expenditure categories MaCurdy and Nechyba construct from their 
theoretical analysis:  
Table 1: California County Spending Categories as Convex Combinations of Stylized Public Goods 
 
Spending Category 
Spillover 
Dimension 
Cost 
Dimension Implication from Model 
Education (g1), g3 c1 Central grants targeted at communities with large young         
     population 
Health g1,( g3) c1,(c2),c3 Local funding, limited central grants 
Welfare g1,( g3), (g4)b c1,(c2),(c3) Mainly local funding if local public good, some central    
     funding targeted somewhat to young population  
     otherwise 
Police and Fire 
Protection 
g1,(g4) (c1),c2,(c3) Some central funding targeted, somewhat targeted to  
     communities with middle-aged population 
Infrastructure g1,g2,g3 (c1),c2,(c3) Split between local and central funding, somewhat targeted   
     to communities with large middle-aged population 
aIn this column, we enclose an item in parentheses to indicate that it is of secondary importance as a component in 
the expenditure category under consideration and thus receives relatively smaller weight in the perceived 
combination of stylized goods making up the category. 
bDepends on whether reductions in poverty are local or state public goods. 
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba(2001) 
 
 MaCurdy and Nechyba predict that spending for education, a mostly public good of type 
g3, is dependent solely upon the proportion of the young population present in the community. 
This means that most of the education funding for education will come from intergovernmental 
transfers. The authors also predict that health, which is targeted at mostly the young and the 
elderly, will get most of its funding from the local level. They believe that infrastructure 
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 spending increases when a community has a large middle-aged population. Predictions for other 
expenditure categories are interpreted in the same straightforward manner.  
In addition to the theoretical study, MaCurdy and Nechyba also investigate the empirical 
applicability of their model of fiscal federalism. They use expenditure and demographic data 
from the Census of Governments for the years 1986-87 and 1991-92 and from the 1990 Census 
STF3A files for the 58 counties of California to carry out a cross-sectional examination. From 
there, they regress seven different dependent variables on selected demographic variables. These 
dependent variables include the five expenditure categories (education, health, welfare, police 
and fire protection, and infrastructure) and the two revenue categories (intergovernmental 
transfers to counties and local taxes used to fund expenditures).  The demographic variables 
include: the fraction of persons in a county aged 0 to 20, the fraction of persons in a county aged 
65 or older, median income for households in the county, and the fraction of households in the 
county living in rural areas. MaCurdy and Nechyba perform regressions on their data in two 
different ways: one as expenditure and revenue shares and the other as per capita measures. They 
also report two sets of estimates for the model, least squares (LS) and least absolute deviations 
(LAD), both of which are performed by implementing bootstrap procedures.  
 From their research, MaCurdy and Nechyba find how each expenditure category is 
funded (by local tax revenues and/or by intergovernmental revenues) as the age demographics of 
the counties in California shift. They find evidence suggesting the age makeup of a county’s 
residents strongly influence its allocations across expenditure categories in both the LAD and LS 
estimates. This change in allocations also seem consistent with the predictions from their model 
of fiscal federalism. (See Table 1.) For example, education expenditures decline when 
demographics shift from young to elderly or from young to middle-aged. They also find that 
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 spending on infrastructure increases when demographics tend towards the middle-aged 
population. Their results also show that totals for changes in total expenditures and revenues 
associated with demographic changes are similar (See Tables A and B in Appendix I for 
MaCurdy and Nechyba’s results).  
 MaCurdy and Nechyba provide a useful method in studying how aging demographics 
affect public expenditures and revenues. Their method grants improved visibility in understand 
the flows between expenditure categories and revenues. However, their method can be modified 
in keeping with other studies, to provide more accurate results. The suggested changes to 
MaCurdy and Nechyba are explained and examined in the next section. 
 
3. Method 
The method for the empirical analysis of this study differs from that of MaCurdy and 
Nechyba in two ways. One modification to the methodology involves extending the study from 
focusing solely on California counties to counties of the 48 continental United States. This 
change will allow for the variations that can occur among states to be captured in the study. 
The other deviation from MaCurdy and Nechyba’s method is the use of a panel data set 
to account for county specific factors and time fixed effects rather than a just cross-sectional data 
set. The rationale for this is that it is important to consider the relationship between aging 
demographics and public expenditure and revenues in a time series. Gradstein and Kaganovich 
(2004) find that in a cross-section analysis, a negative relationship is present between the fraction 
of elderly citizens in a population and education spending, but the same does not necessarily hold 
true in a time series. A district with a larger fraction of the elderly population spends less on 
education than districts with a smaller fraction of the elderly. However, an increase in longevity 
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 raises the overall spending on education since education can be seen as a way to increase 
productivity, which ensures a higher return on savings for retirement. Evidence of the 
significance of longevity suggests that it is not be enough to simply study the cross-sectional 
effect of aging populations. Looking at the relationship in a panel data set that covers both cross-
sectional and time series data is more helpful in understanding how aging demographics affect 
spending and revenues.  
There is an additional strong motivation for using a panel data set to account for county 
fixed effects and time fixed effects in this study. The inclusion of county fixed effects plays a 
significant role in mitigating the consequences of the Tiebout bias, as illustrated in studies by 
Poterba, Ladd and Murray, and Harris et al. The Tiebout bias suggests that “people vote with 
their feet” (Tiebout, 1998). This means that people live in communities in which the local 
government satisfies their preferences, i.e. where the availability and quality of facilities and 
services funded by the local government match their need. For example, families with children 
would want to live in communities with high education spending. Accordingly, a community 
with a larger proportion of school-aged children should have higher spending on education 
simply because parents choose to live there due to this higher education spending. In this 
example, the presence of children does not have any direct impact on education expenditures. 
Instead, high education spending is a cause for an increase in the presence of children. By 
accounting for county fixed effects, I “eliminate all correlation between the error term and the 
elderly population share in each cross-section and thereby reduce the simultaneity bias that 
would otherwise occur (Ladd and Murray, 2001). For example, the county fixed effects can 
capture factors such as a county’s reputation for quality of education (Ladd and Murray, 2001). 
12
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 However, Ladd and Murray do note that the county fixed effects do not completely eliminate the 
Tiebout bias since residential location decisions within counties are not addressed.  
The fact that this study uses data at the county level is an added benefit in the case of 
eliminating the Tiebout bias. If this study were to use state-level data, like that of Poterba as 
mentioned previously, then the Tiebout bias cannot be as completely addressed as it is with 
county-level data. By using county-level data I can address the spending differences between 
communities within states which can affect residential location decisions in addition to the 
movement of households from county to county, rather than just state to state.  
 
4. Replication of MaCurdy and Nechyba 
4.1. Data description 
The goal of this paper is to first replicate MaCurdy and Nechyba’s study, then to deviate 
from their methodology using the proposed plan outlined in the previous section. In order to 
reproduce the study, efforts were made to follow MaCurdy and Nechyba’s method as closely as 
possible. Revenue and expenditure data for the fifty-eight California counties are collected from 
the Census of Governments, a survey collected every five years by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, for the fiscal years 1987 and 1992. Each observation provides data for expenditures or 
revenues in a given county. Data for expenditures are divided into the following categories: 
education (K-12 and community colleges), health (including hospitals), public welfare, and 
police and fire protection. A fifth category is created as a residual of all expenditure not 
classified in the other categories. It is referred to as infrastructure since most of the majority of 
the expenditures in the category is devoted to infrastructure. The revenue data is divided into two 
categories. The first category refers to intergovernmental transfers from the state- and/or federal-
13
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 levels of government to counties, and the second category consists of the amount of total local 
taxes used to fund expenditures within the county. Revenue and expenditure data are expressed 
as shares of total revenue or total expenditure and per capita measures. Demographic variables 
from the 1990 Census STF3A files are also compiled for California counties (MaCurdy and 
Nechyba). A detailed description of the data is provided in Appendix II. Table 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the data I collected. All pecuniary values are reported in 1990 dollars, 
deflated using the CPI (all items) for all urban consumers in the western region of the United 
States. 
Table 2, when compared to the corresponding summary statistics table generated by 
MaCurdy and Nechyba, is almost an exact replica.  However, there are several points of 
divergence. The first difference appears in all per capita measures and the population data. The 
slight difference in the descriptive statistics for per capita values is related to the difference in the 
population data used. The population data is from the Census of Governments, which is 
presumably the same source as MaCurdy and Nechyba used to obtain their data. A second 
difference in the descriptive statistics is the in tax share and intergovernmental share reported for 
1992. Again, the data is from the Census of Governments, the same source as that of MaCurdy 
and Nechyba. Both differences in my data set could be contributed to a number of reasons, such 
as an update of the data. Despite the differences, I can continue with the data set since the 
variation is insignificant. (See Table C in Appendix I for MaCurdy and Nechyba’s summary 
statistics table.)  
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Variable 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992
Population (1,000s) 465.2 513.1 1.3 1.1 31.8 36.7 120.1 133.5 432.7 480.6 8295.9 8863.2
Total expenditures 
($millions) 1.124 1.389 0.007 0.007 0.078 0.099 0.272 0.333 1.114 0.428 20.799 24.304
Total revenue 
($millions) 1.182 1.427 0.006 0.008 0.078 0.096 0.291 0.338 1.129 1.387 21.363 26.227
Education share (%) 0.383 0.383 0.198 0.199 0.339 0.343 0.381 0.381 0.426 0.429 0.565 0.563
Health share (%) 0.101 0.114 0.017 0.022 0.044 0.057 0.095 0.094 0.146 0.163 0.283 0.335
Welfare share (%) 0.110 0.113 0.036 0.047 0.079 0.083 0.104 0.104 0.141 0.141 0.217 0.204
Police and fire 
protection share (%) 0.073 0.072 0.032 0.031 0.058 0.059 0.071 0.067 0.086 0.085 0.124 0.141
Infrastructure share (%) 0.333 0.318 0.177 0.169 0.276 0.266 0.340 0.313 0.371 0.364 0.581 0.478
Intergovernmental 
transfers share (%) 0.502 0.484 0.307 0.259 0.416 0.411 0.496 0.492 0.571 0.556 0.732 0.689
Taxes share (%) 0.498 0.516 0.268 0.311 0.429 0.444 0.504 0.508 0.584 0.589 0.693 0.741
Education per capita 
(1,000s) 0.941 1.030 0.582 0.610 0.802 0.862 0.887 0.972 1.050 1.179 1.881 2.164
Health per capita 
(1,000s) 0.253 0.321 0.040 0.056 0.111 0.131 0.228 0.261 0.348 0.426 0.948 1.286
Welfare per capita 
(1,000s) 0.269 0.302 0.105 0.113 0.189 0.146 0.272 0.295 0.328 0.370 0.476 0.582
Police and fire 
protection per capita 
(1,000s) 0.181 0.196 0.081 0.094 0.136 0.144 0.171 0.176 0.203 0.214 0.542 0.776
Infrastructure per capita 
(1,000s) 0.846 0.873 0.414 0.442 0.647 0.656 0.747 0.806 0.883 0.951 3.346 1.898
Total expenditures per 
capita (1,000s) 2.491 2.723 1.814 1.981 2.123 2.280 2.335 2.560 2.648 2.818 5.754 6.301
Taxes per capita 
(1,000s) 1.296 1.410 0.734 0.731 1.054 1.151 1.252 1.342 1.466 1.559 3.110 3.016
Intergov. transfers per 
capita (1,000s) 1.303 1.325 0.642 0.620 1.051 1.043 1.268 1.232 1.426 1.532 3.232 3.556
Total revenue per capita 
(1,000s) 2.599 2.735 1.850 2.026 2.194 2.284 2.470 2.488 2.800 2.885 5.638 6.484
Fraction of households 
in rural areas
Median household 
income ($10,000)
Fraction of population 
aged 0-20
Fraction of population 
aged 21-64
Fraction of population 
aged 65 and up 
Table 2: Summary Statistics, California Counties in 1990
4.854
0.393
0.568
0.128
0.194
0.506
0.061
0.563
0.122
0.661
0.264
Note:  All monetary values are in 1990 dollars, deflated by the CPI for all urban consumers in the western region of the United States.
Maximum
Demographic variables (as of 1990)
0.365 0.107 0.633
Mean Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
3.056
0.304
1.0000.000
2.049
County expenditure and revenue variables
3.506
0.330
0.590
0.151
2.445
0.282
0.543
0.102
0.296
2.875
0.298
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 4.2. Empirical specification  
In order to understand the relationship among the five expenditure categories and revenue 
types, MaCurdy and Nechyba use separate empirical specifications with each revenue and 
expenditure measure of as dependent variables. The following model is estimated according to 
the seven specifications:  
yj = β1YOUNGj + β2OLDj + β3INCOMEj + β4RURALj + ε j. 
In the model, the subscript j = 1-7 indicates the seven different specifications. In the regression 
equation, y is the vector of expenditure or revenue variables for each U.S. county, each β is a 
parameter value and ε is the disturbance variable. In this equation, there are four control 
variables. They include: the fraction of persons in a county aged 0 to 20 (YOUNG), the fraction 
of persons in a county aged 65 or older (OLD), median income for households in the county 
(INCOME), and the fraction of households in the county living in rural areas (RURAL). This 
analysis also considers two forms of revenue and expenditure data: measures expressed as 
budget shares, and measures reported as per capita expenditures and revenues.  
4.3. Regression results 
The next two tables report two sets of results of the estimates of the model. Table 3 
reports the results for expenditure and revenue shares. In Table 3, the first column lists the 
dependent variables. Each expenditure and revenue share is the average of the 1987 and 1992 
data. For example, “Education share” is the result for which y = 0.5 (1987 education expenditure 
/ 1987 total expenditure) + 0.5 (1992 education expenditure / 1992 total expenditure). Similarly, 
“Intergovernmental transfer share” is the result in which y = 0.5 (1987 intergovernmental 
transfers / 1987 total revenue) + 0.5 (1992 intergovernmental transfers / 1992 total revenue). 
Two sets of estimates are reported in the table. The top result in each row is the ordinary least 
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Budget Measure
20 and 
Below
65 and 
Above
Median 
Income 
($10,000s) Rural Intercept
Expenditure shares
Education share 1.086** 0.616** 0.005 0.042* -0.057
(0.280) (0.302) (0.016) (0.036) (0.154)
0.849** 0.845* 0.007 0.026 -0.014
(0.478) (0.641) (0.024) (0.062) (0.271)
Health share 0.049 0.518* 0.009 0.009 -0.005
(0.328) (0.354) (0.019) (0.043) (0.180)
-0.090 0.606* 0.003 -0.034 0.055
(0.576) (0.529) (0.032) (0.071) (0.315)
Welfare share 0.195* 0.033 -0.040** -0.062** 0.192**
(0.137) (0.148) (0.008) (0.018) (0.075)
0.274* 0.117 -0.042** -0.072** 0.169**
(0.167) (0.220) (0.008) (0.023) (0.088)
-0.264** -0.156** 0.007** -0.021** 0.158**
(0.069) (0.074) (0.004) (0.009) (0.038)
-0.147* -0.014 0.010** -0.028** 0.096*
(0.113) (0.175) (0.005) (0.014) (0.061)
Infrastructure share -1.066** -1.011** 0.018* 0.031 0.711**
(0.252) (0.272) (0.014) (0.033) (0.138)
-1.166** -0.960** 0.028** 0.020 0.703**
(0.375) (0.537) (0.015) (0.052) (0.189)
Revenue shares
0.674** -0.046 -0.083** -0.018 0.554**
(0.377) (0.407) (0.022) (0.049) (0.207)
0.867** -0.081 -0.091** -0.065 0.548
(0.518) (0.836) (0.029) (0.065) (0.313)
Taxes share -0.674** 0.046 0.083** 0.018 0.446**
(0.377) (0.407) (0.022) (0.049) (0.207)
-0.867* 0.081 0.091** 0.065 0.452*
(0.548) (0.864) (0.030) (0.063) (0.329)
Table 3: Effects of Population Age Composition on Expenditure and Revenue Shares for 
California Counties in 1990
Proportion in Age Group
Intergovernmental   
transfer share
Police and fire protection 
share
Notes : The LAD estimates and standard errors were computed with bootstrap procedures (with 1,000 
sample draws). For each budget measure, the first row shows the least squares coefficients, and the 
second row shows the least absolute deviations coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
* Statistically significant t the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level.
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 squares coefficient (OLS), with its corresponding standard deviation reported underneath. Under 
this standard deviation is the bootstrapped coefficient for least absolute deviations (LAD) 
estimates, which are computed with bootstrap procedures with 1,000 sample draws. The standard 
deviation for the bootstrapped LAD estimation is presented immediately below.  
The estimates in Table 3 show that increasing the share of the young population increases 
education expenditure while decreasing the funding going to police and fire protection and to 
infrastructure. In addition, there is some evidence indicating that a larger proportion of the young 
leads to higher public welfare spending, but this is only statistically significant at the 75 percent 
confidence level. In terms of revenue, an increase in the young population leads to greater 
funding from intergovernmental transfers paired with a smaller amount of revenue from taxes.  
 An increase in the elderly share in the county also causes a decrease in the spending on 
infrastructure. The coefficients on both revenue groups are not significant, but the results suggest 
that an older population would result in lower proportions of intergovernmental transfers and 
more from taxes. These results from the regression confirm that of MaCurdy and Nechyba and 
the predictions of Table 1. (See Table D in Appendix I for MaCurdy and Nechyba’s 
corresponding results.)   
Table 4 reports the results for expenditures and revenue shares. The first column lists the 
dependent variables. Expenditure and revenue per capita is constructed as the average of the 
1987 and 1992 per capita data. For example, “Education per capita” is the result for which y = 
0.5 (1987 education expenditure / 1987 population) + 0.5 (1992 education expenditure / 1992 
population). The OLS and bootstrapped LAD coefficients and standard deviations are reported in 
the same way as Table 3. The estimates reported in Table 4 largely confirm the insights provided  
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Per Capita Measure
20 and 
Below
65 and 
Above
Median 
Income 
($10,000s) Rural Intercept
Expenditure per capita
Education per capita 1.527* -0.127 -0.057 0.388** 0.569
(1.025) (1.104) (0.059) (0.133) (0.562)
1.319* -1.266 -0.046 0.425** 0.732*
(0.986) (1.766) (0.051) (0.167) (0.592)
Health per capita -0.466 0.745 -0.026 0.024 0.405
(1.023) (1.103) (0.059) (0.133) (0.561)
0.031 0.279 0.035 0.113 0.060
(1.886) (1.581) (0.095) (0.206) (0.993)
Welfare per capita 0.142 -0.546* -0.116** -0.077** 0.694**
(0.360) (0.387) (0.021) (0.047) (0.197)
-0.187 -0.771 -0.127** -0.091* 0.852**
(0.715) (0.930) (0.029) (0.073) (0.387)
-1.417** -1.523** -0.012 0.043 0.834**
(0.366) (0.395) (0.021) (0.048) (0.201)
-0.915** -0.728 -0.009 -0.093 0.606**
(0.477) (0.730) (0.018) (0.058) (0.273)
Infrastructure per capita -6.110** -7.662** -0.085 0.534** 3.765**
(1.655) (1.783) (0.095) (0.215) (0.907)
-4.058** -5.138* -0.051 0.089 2.790**
(2.412) (3.846) (0.094) (0.264) (1.435)
Total per capita -6.323** -9.113** -0.296** 0.913** 6.268**
(3.045) (3.281) (0.174) (0.396) (1.669)
-2.333 -6.007 -0.287* 0.329 4.778*
(5.454) (7.309) (0.239) (0.539) (3.171)
Revenue per capita
0.022 0.881* 0.044* 0.138** 0.693**
(0.512) (0.552) (0.029) (0.067) (0.281)
-0.587 -0.529 0.024 0.256** 1.076**
(0.946) (1.108) (0.034) (0.107) (0.492)
Taxes per capita 0.088 -0.464 0.016 0.020 0.905**
(0.679) (0.732) (0.039) (0.088) (0.373)
-0.769 -1.452* -0.022 0.072 1.374**
(0.798) (1.046) (0.036) (0.113) (0.393)
Total per capita -8.653** -10.291** -0.393** 0.739** 7.549**
(3.140) (3.383) (0.180) (0.408) (1.722)
0.365 -2.854 -0.253 0.170 3.489
(6.438) (8.770) (0.282) (0.602) 3.730
Table 4: Effects of Population Age Composition on per Capita Expenditures and Revenues 
for California Counties in 1990
Notes : The LAD estimates and standard errors were computed with bootstrap procedures (with 1,000 
sample draws). For each per capita measure, the first row shows the least squares coefficients, and the 
second row shows the least absolute deviations coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
* Statistically significant t the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level.
Police and fire protection 
per capita
Intergovernmental 
transfer per capita
Proportion in Age Group
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 on the relationships between demographics and spending of Table 3. (See Table E in Appendix I 
for MaCurdy and Nechyba’s results.) 
There is one important point in this section of the empirical analysis that diverges from 
that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. They perform bootstrapped LAD estimates in their empirical 
analysis whereas I did not. However, when comparing the results with that of the original authors, 
the implications are very similar. 
4.4. Implications of findings 
In replicating the study of MaCurdy and Nechyba, the method of exploring the budgetary 
consequences of changing the age composition of a California county’s population using results 
from OLS and LAD regressions are also reproduced. This is displayed in Tables 5 and 6. 
Tables 5 and 6 are constructed in a similar way. A single difference between the tables 
stems from the fact that one is an examination of OLS estimates while the other examines results 
from least absolute deviation estimates. The information in these tables is drawn from Table 4, in 
which all dependent variables are reported in per capita values. The first column of each table 
describes the demographic change under scrutiny. The first row investigates the consequences of 
increasing the fraction of middle-aged people by decreasing the fraction of elderly people by the 
same magnitude, while the fraction of young people is held constant. The second and third rows 
are created in a similar fashion. The second column in each table gives the prediction of the 
effect of the demographic shift on per capita expenditures. The third column calls out the 
projection of the effects of the demographic shift on per capita intergovernmental transfers and 
local government taxes when demographic shifts are applied. The values in both columns are 
simply the consequences implied by the point estimates in Table 4. The last row of each table 
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 describes the effects generated by shifting the demographics from young to old, which are 
calculated by subtracting the young coefficients from the elderly coefficients reported in Table 4. 
Table 5: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population in California in 1990, 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and Nechyba’s Method) 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues 
Old => middle-aged Education + $127 IG Transfers - $881 
Police and Fire + $1,523 Own Taxes + $464 
Infrastructure + $7,662 Total     
Total + $7,312 - $417 
Young => middle-aged Education - $1,527 IG Transfers - $22 
Police and Fire + $1,417 Own Taxes - $88 
Infrastructure + $6,110     
Total + $6,000 Total - $110 
Young => old Education - $1,400 IG Transfers + $859 
Public Welfare - $688 Own Taxes - $552 
Police and Fire - $106     
  Total - $2,194 Total + $307 
 
 
Table 6: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population in California in 1990, 
Least Absolute Deviation Estimates (MaCurdy and Nechyba’s Method) 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues 
Old => middle-aged Education + $1,266 IG Transfers + $529 
Police and Fire + $728 Own Taxes + $1,452 
Infrastructure + $5,138     
Total + $7,132 Total + $1,981 
Young => middle-aged Education - $1,319 IG Transfers + $587 
Police and Fire + $915 Own Taxes + $769 
Infrastructure + $4,058     
Total + $3,654 Total + $1,356 
Young => old Education - $2,585 IG Transfers + $58 
Public Welfare - $584 Own Taxes - $683 
Police and Fire + $187     
  Total  - $2,982 Total - $625 
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 Note that not all expenditure categories appear in Tables 5 or 6. The expenditure 
categories that do appear in the first and second rows are selected based on the fact that at least 
one of the estimated coefficients in Table 3 or 4 is statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level for either LAD or OLS estimates. This means that if a coefficient is significant 
at the 90 percent confidence level for the LAD estimate, but not for OLS, it will still be reported. 
The expenditure categories that appear in the third row are categories in which the linear 
combinations of the coefficients of young (20 and Below) share and old (65 and Above) share in 
Table 3 or 4 are significant at the 90 percent confidence level for either LAD or OLS estimates. 
Table 7 on the next page lists the results of these linear combinations. 
In Table 7, the first column lists the dependent variables. The second column shows 
results for budget share figures and the third column reports the results for per capita measures. 
The results of the linear combinations of the coefficients of the young (20 and Below) share and 
the old (65 and Above) share for OLS estimators are at the top of each row with its standard 
error immediately underneath. Underneath these standard errors are the coefficients for LAD 
estimates with corresponding standard errors underneath.   
In investigating the budgetary consequences of changing age compositions, as shown in 
Tables 5 and 6, I have ascertained different implications than that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. 
(See Tables A and B in Appendix I for MaCurdy and Nechyba’s budgetary consequences. Tables 
A and B mostly confirm the predictions MaCurdy and Nechyba report in Table 1.) MaCurdy and 
Nechyba find that, “While the total for changes in expenditures and revenues associated with 
each demographic shift may appear to produce budgetary imbalance, conventional hypothesis 
tests indicate that total changes in expenditures and revenues are never significantly different 
from one another for any of the shifts considered, using either LS or LAD” (MaCurdy and  
22
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 5 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/10
  
 
Measure Budget Share Per Capita
Expenditures
Education 0.470** 1.654**
(0.247) (0.904)
0.005 2.585**
(0.462) (1.262)
Health -0.469* -1.211*
(0.290) (0.903)
-0.696* -0.248
(0.543) (1.533)
Welfare 0.161* 0.687**
(0.121) (0.317)
0.158 0.584
(0.144) (0.620)
Police and fire protection
-0.108** 0.106
(0.061) (0.323)
-0.133* -0.187
(0.114) (0.389)
Infrastructure -0.055 1.553
(0.223) (1.460)
-0.206 1.080
(0.385) (1.993)
Revenue shares
0.720** -0.858**
(0.333) (0.452)
0.948* -0.058
(0.578) (0.683)
Taxes -0.720** 0.552
(0.333) (0.600)
-0.948* 0.683
(0.591) (0.755)
Intergovernmental transfer 
* Statistically significant t the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
Table 7: Linear combinations of Coefficients of Young and Old Shares for Expenditure and Revenue Shares and 
per Capita Expenditure and Revenue for California Counties in 1990
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 Nechyba, 2001).  Instead, I find that total changes in per capita expenditures and revenues 
associated with each demographic shift are vastly different from one another. 
 Analyzing the budgetary consequences of age compositions in the manner of MaCurdy 
and Nechyba is helpful because it makes visible the way demographic shifts affect total revenues 
and expenditures. However, I suggest a different approach be taken in accomplishing this task. 
Instead of reporting the change in individual expenditure and revenue categories and finding the 
sum of all the categories reported to find the total change in expenditure per capita and revenue 
per capita, I suggest that budgetary consequences can be found by simply comparing the point 
estimates of total expenditure per capita and revenue per capita taken from Table 4. The reason 
for this alternative method is to minimize the standard error. When different expenditure (or 
revenue) categories are added together in order to find the total change, the standard errors of all 
the categories are compounded together. As a result, the standard error of the resulting sum of 
revenues or expenditures tends to be high. By simply taking the total per capita revenue or total 
per capita expenditure point estimates in Table 4 to compare how they are affected by 
demographic shifts, the standard error is kept as small as possible. The results of this alternative 
method using OLS estimates are presented in Table 8 and the results with LAD is shown in 
Table 9.   
 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged + $9,113 + $10,291
Young => middle-aged + $6,323 + $8,653
Young => old - $2,790 - $1,638
Table 8: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California in 1990, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (Alternative Method)
Effects on Total Expenditure Effects on Total Revenue
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The total revenue and expenditure changes in Tables 8 and 9 mostly correspond to the results of 
MaCurdy and Nechyba in analyzing budgetary consequences. The OLS estimates show that per 
capita revenues and per capita expenditures shift in a similar fashion as one another as the age 
composition alters. The LAD estimates do not show this result when shifting the demographics 
from old to middle-aged and from young to middle-aged. However, all these LAD figures are 
neither statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level nor the 75 percent confidence 
level as shown in Table 4. Admittedly, these tables do not make visible the changes in individual 
expenditure and revenue categories due to shifting demographics that contribute to the total 
change. However, that information is available in the form of Tables 3 and 4, which display the 
effects of population age composition on individual expenditures and revenues. 
 
5. A different look at California 
 MaCurdy and Nechyba examine how aging demographics affect the expenditures and 
revenues of the fifty-eight counties of California in 1990. But what happens if I examine the 
fifty-eight counties of California in 2000? Will the results be the same? What if I examined the 
counties of California with county fixed and time fixed effects? 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged + $6,007 + $2,854
Young => middle-aged + $2,333 - $365
Young => old - $3,674 - $3,219
Table 9: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California in 1990, Least Absolute Deviation Estimates (Alternative Method)
Effects on Total Expenditure Effects on Total Revenue
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 5.1. Data description, empirical specifications, and regression results for California counties in 
1990, 2000 and with fixed effects 
 To investigate how aging demographics affect the expenditures and revenues of the fifty-
eight counties of California in 2000, I repeat almost the same method as described previously. 
One divergence in the methodology involves using a different data set. The new data set 
originates from the same sources as that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. The new data set contains 
revenue and expenditure data for the fifty-eight California counties from the Census of 
Governments for the fiscal years 1997 and 2002. Demographic variables from the 2000 Census 
STF3A files are used. (See Table F in Appendix I for the summary statistics for this data set.)  
The same model as previously described is estimated using this new 2000 California 
county data set. There are two additional differences in methodology. The model is estimated 
using only OLS estimators for this data set. In addition, all pecuniary values for revenues and 
expenditures are reported in 2007 dollars, which are deflated using the CPI (all items) for the all 
urban consumers in the United States.3 In order to allow for comparison with measures reported 
in the same dollars, this procedure is performed with the 1990 California county data set. The 
results of the OLS estimates are reported in Table 10 and Table 11. Table 10 reports the effects 
of population age composition on expenditure and revenue shares. Table 11 displays the effects 
of population age composition on per capita expenditure and revenue. For both tables, the first 
column underneath each independent variable refers to coefficients obtained from 1990 
California county data, while the second column refers to 2000 California county data. 
 The third column under each explanatory variable in Tables 10 and 11 relays the 
coefficients of OLS estimators for a different model, one that uses a single panel data set created 
                                                          
3
 Note that median household income, an explanatory variable, is not in 2007 dollars. Instead, it is in 2000 dollars. 
To get point-estimates for median household income, deflate using CPI. 
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 by combining the 1990 and 2000 data sets to examine the fifty-eight counties of California with 
county and time fixed effects. The model is as follows: 
yijt = β1YOUNGijt + β2OLDijt + β3INCOMEijt + β4RURALijt + δij + τjt + ε ijt. 
This model is very similar to the previous model except for several additions. In this regression 
equation, the subscript i represents county and t denotes time. In addition, δ captures county 
fixed effects, τ accounts for time fixed effects, and ε is the disturbance variable.  
 All parameters and explanatory variables remain the same. As in the previous model, this 
analysis also considers the two different forms of revenue and expenditure data: measures 
expressed as budget shares, and measures reported as per capita expenditures ad revenues.  
 The results of Tables 10 and 11 for California counties in 1990 largely agree with that of 
Tables 3 and 4. The revenue and expenditure share estimates are exactly the same while the per 
capita and the per capita measure coefficients have changed by a scalar, which is to be expected 
since the only disparity between the 1990 regressions in Tables 10 and 11 and in Tables 3 and 4 
is the CPI used to deflate the revenue and expenditure measures. However, in comparing the 
results of the three data sets, the conclusions to be drawn are not the same. This is evident when 
comparing the relationship (positive or negative) between age composition and expenditure and 
revenue. Table 12 summarizes the differences between the effects (positive or negative) of age 
demographics shares on expenditures and revenue shares. Table 13 recaps this information for 
per capita expenditure and revenue.   
Tables 12 and 13 show the signs of estimated coefficients for each expenditure and 
revenue category. These tables show that the relationships between demographics and 
expenditures and revenues change when looking at the three different data sets.  For example, 
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 spending on health increases when the young proportion grows according to the 1990 data set, 
but according to the panel data set, the relationship is negative. 
Additionally, according to the tables, some relationships change when comparing one 
year to another. For instance, intergovernmental transfers rise when the young population share 
increases for the year 1990, but the relationship is negative in 2000. The health, police and fire 
protection, public welfare, taxes, and intergovernmental transfers are affected by age 
demographics in a different way in 1990 than in 2000. The tables also report that the effects of 
age demographics on health, police and fire protection, infrastructure, and public welfare shift in 
the opposite direction when time and/or county fixed effects are applied. This may mean that a 
least these expenditure categories are affected by the Tiebout bias, that people choose to live in  
 
Budget Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expenditure shares
Education share +** +** +** +** + +**
Health share + - - +* + -**
Welfare share +* + +* + + +*
-** -* - -** + -
Infrastructure share -** -** -** -** -** +
Revenue shares
+* + + - -* +*
Taxes share -** - - + +* -* 
Table 12: Summary of Changes of Young Share and Old Share in 1990, 2000, and Panel California 
County Data Sets for Expenditure and Revenue Shares
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
Police and fire 
protection share
Intergovernmental   
transfer share
20 and Below 65 and Below
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specific counties according to the counties’ spending. The same implication applies to 
intergovernmental transfers and taxes.   
5.2. Implications of findings 
 Table 14 examines the implications of the OLS regression results in the alternative 
method proposed in Section 4.4. (See Tables G, H, and I in Appendix I for analysis of 
implications using MaCurdy and Nechyba’s method to compare. Results from this method 
largely correspond to the findings of Tables 5 and 6 in this paper.)   
Per Capita Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expenditure per capita
Education per capita +* +** + - -* +
Health per capita - - -* + + -**
Welfare per capita + - + -* -* +
Police and fire 
protection per capita
-** -** - -** -** -**
Infrastructure per 
capita
-** -** -* -** -** +
Total per capita -** - -* -** -** -**
Revenue per capita
Intergovernmental 
transfer per capita + - +** +* - +
Taxes per capita + + -* - + -**
Total per capita +** + - -** -** -*
Table 13: Summary of Changes in 1990, 2000, and Panel California County Data Sets for per Capita 
Expenditures and Revenues
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
20 and Below 65 and Below
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 The budgetary consequences due to changing the age composition of a county’s 
population in California according to the 1990, the 2000, and the panel data sets largely confirm 
the findings of MaCurdy and Nechyba and my version of their analysis in Tables 8 and 9. The 
totals for changes in expenditures and revenues associated with a demographic transformation 
seem to generate budgetary imbalances. However, these budgetary imbalances are rendered 
benign as total change in expenditures and revenues tend to change in a similar manner. This 
suggests that, at least for California counties, aging demographics do affect expenditure 
categories; however, intergovernmental transfers and/or tax revenues respond in a similar way in 
an attempt to bridge the change in public spending. 
 
6. A look at the United States 
 Now that I have examined the counties of California in 1990, 2000, and with county and 
time fixed effects, what happens when I extend the study to the rest of the United States? 
6.1. Data description  
 In examining how aging demographics affect the revenues and expenditures of counties 
in the United States, a new 1990, 2000, and panel data set is needed. For this, data is once again 
collected from the same sources. Revenue and expenditure are gathered from the data for the 
Census of Governments for the fiscal years 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002 for all the counties in the 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged + $14,502 + $21,574 + $12,388 + $16,380 + $24,839 + $10,350
Young => middle-aged + $10,067 + $7,497 + $8,842 + $13,772 + $7,493 + $4,274
Young => old - $4,435 - $14,077 - $3,546 - $2,608 - $17,346 - $6,076
Effect on Total per Capita Revenues
1990 2000
Panel Data 
Set2000
Panel Data 
Set
Table 14: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population in California using 
1990, 2000, and Panel Data Sets, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (Alternative Method)
Effect on Total per Capita Expenditures
1990
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 United States, except for Washington D.C., counties in Hawaii and Alaska, and any other 
counties with missing data for any of the years under examination. (Missing data results from 
county boundaries being redrawn so that new counties are added or eliminated.) The total 
number of counties investigated amount to 3,103 counties.  Demographic variables from the 
1990 and 2000 Census STF3A files are also used. Note that all pecuniary variables are reported 
in 2007 dollars, deflated using the CPI (all items) for all urban consumers in the United States.4 
(See Tables J and K in Appendix I for summary statistics of the 1990 and 2000 Unites States 
county data sets.)  
6.2. Empirical specification 
 The empirical specification for the 1990, 2000, and panel data sets is the same as in 
Section 5. 
6.2. Regression results 
 Tables 15 and 16 show the results of OLS estimates of the three data sets constructed. 
These tables have the same format as that of Tables 10 and 11. Table 15 reports effects of 
population age composition on expenditure and revenue shares. Table 16 displays the effects of 
population age composition on per capita expenditure and revenue. Like the California results, 
the regressions from using 1990 United States county data, 2000 United States county data, and a 
panel data set of 1990 and 2000 United States county data yield conflicting insights on how age 
demographics affect expenditures and revenues. 
   
                                                          
4
 Note that median household income, an explanatory variable, is not in 2007 dollars. Instead, it is in 1990 or 2000 
dollars. To get point-estimates for median household income, deflate using CPI. 
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 Table 17 recaps the negative or positive effects of aging demographics on expenditure and 
revenue shares, while Table 18 sums up the consequences for per capita expenditure and revenue. 
Tables 17 and 18 are formatted the same way as Tables 12 and 13.  These tables report that the 
effect of age demographics on expenditures and revenues vary from one data set to another.  
As with California, Tables 17 and 18 show that the relationships between demographics 
and expenditures and revenues differ when comparing the three data sets.  For instance, 
infrastructure expenditures decrease as the elderly proportion increase in 1990, but the 
relationship is actually positive when time and/or county fixed effects are added. However, 
unlike in the case of California, only one effect is different when comparing 1990 to 2000. When 
the share of the elderly population grows, the taxes increase in 1990, but decrease in 2000. It 
seems as if the element of time does not have a significant role when investigating the 
expenditures of counties of the United States. 
 
Budget Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expendiure shares
Education share +** +** +** -** -** -*
Health share +** +** +** + +** +**
Welfare share - -* + +** +** -*
-** -** -** -** -** +
Infrastructure share -** -** -** +** +** -*
Revenue shares
-** -** +** -** -** +*
Taxes share +** +** -** +** +** -*
Table 17: Summary of Changes of Young Share and Old Share in 1990, 2000, and Panel United States 
County Data Sets for Expenditure and Revenue Shares
20 and Below 65 and Below
Police and fire 
protection share
Intergovernmental   
transfer share
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
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 Tables 17 and 18 also indicate that, like California counties, aging demographics affect 
health, police and fire protection, infrastructure, public welfare spending, and both revenue 
categories of United States counties in the opposite direction when time and/or county fixed 
effects are applied. This may be evidence that these particular categories, at the very least, are 
affected by the Tiebout bias since the addition of fixed effects has changed results.   
6.3. Implications of findings 
 Table 19 below examines the budgetary consequences of shifting age demographics of a 
county in the United States with 1990, 2000, and panel data sets on total per capita expenditure 
Per Capita Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expenditure per capita
Education per capita +** +** + +** +** -
Health per capita +** +** - +** +** +*
Welfare per capita + + +* +** +** -
Police and fire 
protection per capita
-** -** -** -** - +**
Infrastructure per 
capita + -* -* +** +** -**
Total per capita +** +** -** +** +** -
Revenue per capita
Intergovernmental 
transfer per capita
-** -** -** -** - -**
Taxes per capita +** -** +* +** - +*
Total per capita +** +** -** +** +** +*
Table 18: Summary of Changes in 1990, 2000, and Panel United States County Data Sets for per 
Capita Expenditures and Revenue
20 and Below 65 and Below
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
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 and per capita revenue. (See Tables L, M, and N in Appendix I for analysis of implications using 
MaCurdy and Nechyba’s method to compare. Again, results from this method largely correspond 
to the findings of Tables 5 and 6 in this paper.)   
The budgetary consequences of changing the age composition of changing a county’s 
population in California according to the 1990, the 2000, and a panel data set largely confirm the 
findings of MaCurdy and Nechyba and my version of their analysis in Tables 8 and 9. The totals 
for changes in expenditures and revenues associated with a demographic transformation seem to 
generate budgetary imbalances. However, these potential budgetary imbalances in county 
governments are rendered benign as total change in expenditures and revenues tend to change in 
a similar manner. 
 
7. Comparing California and the United States 
 The previous sections have compared the counties of the United States and of California 
within their respective triad of data sets. How about comparing California counties to all the 
counties of the United States? Is it legitimate to apply the results of California counties to the rest 
of the counties in the United States? 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged - $4,960 - $6,653 + $678 - $5,175 - $6,769 - $942
Young => middle-aged - $5,226 - $4,879 + $1,685 - $5,598 - $4,912 + $2,012
Young => old - $266 + $1,774 + $1,007 - $423 + $1,857 + $2,954
Panel Data 
Set1990 2000
Panel Data 
Set 1990 2000
Table 19: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population in California using 
1990, 2000, and Panel Data Sets, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (Alternative Method)
Effect on Total per Capita Expenditures Effect on Total per Capita Revenues
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  Tables 20 and 21 provide an answer to whether the effects of aging demographics on 
expenditures and revenues using 1990, 2000, and panel data sets for California counties and 
United States counties differ. Table 20 examines budget shares while Table 21 investigates per 
capita measures. The information presented in the tables report that there are a good number of 
conflicting effects that appear when comparing the counties of California and the United States. 
This implies that, at least in terms of the direction of the effect if aging demographics, the results 
of California counties cannot be extended to the counties of the United States. 
 
 
 
Budget Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expendiure shares
Education share No No No Yes Yes Yes
Health share No Yes Yes No No Yes
Welfare share Yes Yes No No No Yes
No No No No Yes Yes
Infrastructure share No No No Yes Yes Yes
Revenue shares
Yes Yes No No No No
Taxes share Yes Yes No No No No
Table 20: Do the Effects of Aging Demographics on Expenditure and Revenue Shares Differ when 
Comparing the Data Sets from California Counties to that of United States Counties?
20 and Below 65 and Below
Police and fire 
protection share
Intergovernmental   
transfer share
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
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8. Conclusion 
 This study is designed to answer the question: How does a change in the age composition 
of a county’s population alter a local government’s spending on public goods and on its sources 
(local taxes or state/federal) for funding these expenditures? MaCurdy and Nechyba find that 
their regressions results, which are generated using data for the fifty-eight California counties in 
1990, largely correspond with their predictions, which are summarized in Table 1. They find that 
infrastructure and police and fire protection are indeed public goods targeted at middle-aged 
Per Capita Measure 1990 2000 Panel Data 1990 2000 Panel Data
Expenditure per capita
Education per capita No No No Yes Yes Yes
Health per capita Yes Yes No No No Yes
Welfare per capita No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Police and fire 
protection per capita No No No No No Yes
Infrastructure per 
capita Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Total per capita Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Revenue per capita
Intergovernmental 
transfer per capita Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Taxes per capita No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Total per capita No No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 21: Do the Effects of Aging Demographics on per Capita Expenditures and Revenues Differ 
when Comparing the Data Sets from California Counties to that of United States Counties?
20 and Below 65 and Below
* Statistically significant at the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
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 communities. An increase in the share of the elderly population or in the young population 
causes a decrease in spending for these two categories. In addition, education spending increases 
as the proportion of the young population increases. It also appears to be true that an increase in 
the proportion of the young population leads to greater revenues from intergovernmental 
transfers with a smaller amount of revenues generated from taxes. There is also some evidence 
for a positive relationship between public welfare expenditures and the share of the young 
population. 
  By replicating MaCurdy and Nechyba’s study for California counties in 1990, I also find 
the same results with some adjustments. However, when I examine California counties in 2000 
using the same methods, the results do not correspond to that of MaCurdy and Nechyba. In fact, 
the regression results of two expenditure categories and intergovernmental transfers indicate that 
the age composition has the opposite effect of what is reported in 1990. Furthermore, when I 
investigate the effects of age demographics on expenditures and revenues while factoring in time 
and county fixed effects to control for the Tiebout bias, the results do not correspond to that of 
MaCurdy and Nechyba. Consequently, the effects of age demographics differ from the 1990, 
2000, and the panel data sets. The fact that the cost of age composition differ from the cross-
sectional data set to the panel data set suggests that the categories, at the very least, that exhibit a 
different relationship are subject to the Tiebout bias, meaning that people choose to live in 
certain counties because the spending or revenues in certain counties correspond with their 
preferences. For the California county data, these categories include: health, police and fire 
protection, infrastructure, public welfare, intergovernmental transfers, and taxes.  
 This study also extends the examination to the counties of the United States. Similar 
conclusions to that of counties of California are reached in that there were conflicting results in 
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 comparing the 1990 data set to the 2000 data set to the panel data set. Once again, I am led to 
believe that at least certain revenue and expenditure categories are affected by the Tiebout bias. 
The results seem to imply that looking at cross-sectional data to answer the question of the 
effects of age demographics is not enough, that county and time fixed effects also need to be 
considered.  
 The study also compares the results of the United States counties to that of California. 
The consequences of age demographics are not consistent when comparing the two sets of 
outcomes. This leads me conclude that the conclusions MaCurdy and Nechyba obtained in their 
study of California county governments is not representative of all United States county 
governments. 
 Interestingly enough, the effects of age demographics found using the United States panel 
data largely corroborate with MaCurdy and Nechyba’s projections regarding expenditure 
categories. However, the consequence on intergovernmental transfers and taxes do not line up as 
neatly. 
 Despite all the mixed results, there is one point that MaCurdy and Nechyba find that 
remains consistent from one data set to the next. They find, in their study that the effects of aging 
demographics are benign because revenues and expenditures tend to shift in a similar manner; 
this means that an increase in expenditure is compensated by an increase in revenue. This 
suggests that tax and intergovernmental programs that are in place in county governments are on 
the right path to dealing with the effects of aging demographics.     
8.1. Suggestions for further studies 
 The conclusion of this study indicates that the county and time fixed effects play a role in 
public spending and revenues in county governments. This implies that the Tiebout bias is a 
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 consequence that should be seriously considered. In order to more fully account for the Tiebout 
bias, there are two suggestions that can be incorporated into the panel data set for the United 
States. The first is that additional data can be gathered. The panel data in this study only includes 
two years. Additional years can lend further insights to the topic. This data set can also include 
an instrument variable such as that of Ladd and Murray (2001). They instrument for elderly 
population, which are people 65 years and older, with the share of population between ages 55 to 
64 in the county ten years earlier. This method should eliminate any remaining issues caused by 
the Tiebout bias.  
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 Appendix 
Appendix I. Additional Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Infrastructure + $6,125 IG Transfers + $3,343
Own Taxes + $4,804
Total + $6,125 Total + $8,147
Young => middle-aged Education - $2,143 IG Transfers + $418
Police and Fire + $1,157 Own Taxes + $5,353
Infrastructure + $4,864
Total + $3,878 Total + $5,771
Young => old Education - $2,138 IG Transfers - $2,925
Own Taxes + $549
Total - $2,138 Total - $2,376
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001)
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table A: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California, Least Squares Estimates
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Infrastructure + $4,130 IG Transfers + $4,427
Own Taxes + $2,402
Total + $4,130 Total + $6,829
Young => middle-aged Education - $1,813 IG Transfers - $107
Police and Fire + $746 Own Taxes + $2,682
Infrastructure + $3,651
Total + $2,584 Total + $2,575
Young => old Education - $2,694 IG Transfers - $4,534
Own Taxes + $280
Total - $2,694 Total - $4,254
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001)
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table B: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California, Least Absolute Deviation Estimate
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Variable 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992
Population (1,000s) 465.2 513.1 1.3 1.1 31.8 36.7 120.1 133.5 432.7 480.6 8295.9 8863.2
Total expenditures 
($millions) 1.124 1.389 0.007 0.007 0.078 0.099 0.272 0.333 1.114 0.428 20.799 24.304
Total revenue 
($millions) 1.182 1.427 0.006 0.008 0.078 0.096 0.291 0.338 1.129 1.387 21.363 26.227
Education share (%) 0.383 0.383 0.198 0.199 0.339 0.344 0.381 0.381 0.426 0.429 0.565 0.563
Health share (%) 0.101 0.114 0.017 0.022 0.044 0.058 0.095 0.094 0.146 0.162 0.283 0.335
Welfare share (%) 0.110 0.113 0.036 0.047 0.079 0.083 0.104 0.104 0.141 0.141 0.217 0.204
Police and fire 
protection share (%) 0.073 0.072 0.032 0.031 0.059 0.059 0.071 0.067 0.086 0.085 0.124 0.141
Infrastructure share (%) 0.333 0.318 0.177 0.169 0.277 0.266 0.340 0.313 0.371 0.363 0.581 0.478
Intergovernmental 
transfers share (%) 0.502 0.479 0.307 0.257 0.416 0.411 0.496 0.492 0.571 0.556 0.732 0.689
Taxes share (%) 0.498 0.521 0.268 0.314 0.430 0.449 0.513 0.582 0.596 0.589 0.693 0.743
Education per capita 
(1,000s) 0.944 1.076 0.573 0.646 0.820 0.886 0.904 1.025 1.057 1.258 1.799 2.144
Health per capita 
(1,000s) 0.254 0.333 0.041 0.057 0.114 0.150 0.233 0.265 0.357 0.432 0.927 1.293
Welfare per capita 
(1,000s) 0.270 0.316 0.108 0.119 0.198 0.234 0.270 0.310 0.320 0.394 0.480 0.600
Police and fire 
protection per capita 
(1,000s) 0.182 0.204 0.078 0.095 0.136 0.148 0.172 0.189 0.208 0.228 0.476 0.800
Infrastructure per capita 
(1,000s) 0.845 0.908 0.414 0.463 0.662 0.702 0.773 0.849 0.873 1.017 2.936 2.986
Total expenditures per 
capita (1,000s) 2.493 2.838 1.822 2.128 2.164 2.395 2.377 2.680 2.645 2.962 5.051 6.493
Taxes per capita 
(1,000s) 1.298 1.485 0.723 0.783 1.076 1.214 1.259 1.419 1.472 1.593 2.729 3.161
Intergov. transfers per 
capita (1,000s) 1.303 1.371 0.651 0.657 1.065 1.073 1.281 1.330 1.444 1.544 3.091 3.665
Fraction of households 
in rural areas
Median household 
income ($10,000)
Fraction of population 
aged 0-20
Fraction of population 
aged 21-64
Fraction of population 
aged 65 and up 
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001)
Table C: Summary Statistics, California Counties in 1990
Note:  All monetary values are in 1990 dollars, deflated by the CPI for all urban consumers in the western region of the United States.
0.128 0.061 0.102 0.122 0.149 0.264
0.661
0.304 0.194 0.283 0.298 0.330 0.393
0.568 0.506 0.543 0.563 0.590
0.632 1.000
3.056 2.049 2.457 2.875 3.505 4.854
0.296
County expenditure and revenue variables
Demographic variables (as of 1990)
0.365 0.000 0.109
MaximumMean Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
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Budget Measure
20 and 
Below
65 and 
Above 
Median 
Income 
($10,000s) Rural Intercept
Expenditure shares
Education share 1.001** 0.493 0.003 0.049 -0.009 
(0.369) (0.535) (0.017) (0.052) (0.209)
0.896** 0.688 0.005 0.036 -0.006 
(0.479) (1.647) (0.024) (0.060) (0.276)
Health share 0.062 0.553* 0.009 0.011 -0.014 
(0.334) (0.405) (0.019) (0.048) (0.186)
-0.027 0.510 0.008 -0.012 0.025
(0.569) (0.541) (0.032) (0.070) (0.311)
Welfare share 0.183* 0.005 -0.041** -0.061** 0.202**
(0.161) (0.206) (0.008) (0.017) (0.090)
0.211* 0.001 -0.041** 0.061** 0.195**
(0.164) (0.230) (0.008) (0.024) (0.086)
-0.253** -0.131 -0.007** -0.025** 0.153**
(0.094) (0.147) (0.004) (0.013) (0.053)
-0.179* -0.031 0.009** -0.030** 0.111**
(0.119) (0.180) (0.005) (0.014) (0.066)
Infrastructure share -1.021** -0.967** 0.020* 0.026 0.688**
(0.321) (0.449) (0.013) (0.042) (0.173)
-1.223** -1.024** 0.015 -0.004 0.778**
(0.382) (0.536) (0.016) (0.049) (0.198)
Revenue shares
0.663** -0.139 -0.085** -0.018 0.571**
(0.389) (0.646) (0.021) (0.048) (0.239)
0.541 -0.290 -0.091** -0.051 0.662**
(0.553) (0.825) (0.031) (0.067) (0.331)
Taxes share -0.696** 0.126 0.083** 0.014 0.448**
(0.397) (0.636) (0.020) (0.047) (0.240)
-0.571 0.271 0.089** 0.048 0.356
(0.529) (0.817) (0.029) (0.066) (0.317)
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba(2001) 
Table D: Effects of Population Age Composition on Expenditure and Revenue Shares for 
California Counties
Proportion in Age Group
Police and fire protection 
share
Intergovernmental   
transfer share
Notes : All estimates and standard errors were computed with bootstrap procedures (with 1,000 sample 
draws). For each budget measure, the first row shows the least squares coefficients, and the second 
row shows the least absolute deviations coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Statistically significant t the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level.
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Per Capita Measure
20 and 
Below
65 and 
Above
Median 
Income 
($10,000s) Rural Intercept
Expenditure per capita
Education per capita 2.143** 00.52 -0.046 .352** 0.360
(0.921) (2.018) (0.052) (0.131) (0.629)
1.813** -0.884 -0.056 0.325** 0.613
(0.980) (1.700) (0.052) (0.161) (0.583)
Health per capita -0.155 1.052 -0.016 0.037 0.241
(1.130) (1.264) (0.061) (0.142) (0.618)
-0.235 0.514 0.013 0.047 0.208
(1.889) (1.627) (0.104) (0.208) (1.042)
Welfare per capita 0.312 -0.467 -0.116** -0.094** 0.646**
(0.137) (0.148) (0.008) (0.018) (0.075)
0.107 -0.647 -0.122** -0.093* 0.742**
(0.713) (0.947) (0.030) (0.078) (0.388)
-1.157** -1.214 -0.004 0.015 0.705**
(0.577) (1.095) (0.019) (0.085) (0.341)
-0.746* -0.529 -.0002 -0.082* 0.505**
(0.479) (0.721) (0.017) (0.057) (0.273)
Infrastructure per capita -4.864** -6.152* -0.047 0.409* 3.129**
(2.408) (4.339) (0.086) (0.350) (1.413)
-3.651* -4.103* -0.029 0.074 2.514**
(2.316) (3.493) (0.093) (0.248) (1.360)
Total per capita -3.846 -7.156 -0.230* 0.757* 5.162**
(4.117) (7.176) (0.163) (0.577) (2.427)
-0.226 -5.503 -0.163 0.440 3.689
(5.693) (7.624) (0.252) (0.501) (3.334)
Revenue per capita
-0.418 -3.343 -0.326** 0.328 2.761**
(2.068) (4.161) (0.095) (0.318) (1.314)
0.107 -4.427* -0.315** 0.039 2.872**
(2.225) (2.897) (0.104) (0.234) (1.331)
Taxes per capita -5.353** -4.804* 0.019 0.335 3.443**
(2.912) (4.124) (0.120) (0.340) (1.631)
-2.682 -2.402 0.125 0.314 1.976
(4.918) (6.323) (0.195) (0.410) (2.771)
Source: MaCurdy and Nechyba(2001)
Table E: Effects of Population Age Composition on per Capita Expenditures and Revenues 
for California Counties
Police and fire protection 
per capita
Intergovernmental 
transfer per capita
Notes : All estimates and standard errors were computed with bootstrap procedures (with 1,000 sample 
draws). For each per capita, the first row shows the least squares coefficients, and the second row 
shows the least absolute deviations coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Statistically significant t the 75% confidence level.    ** Statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level.
Proportion in Age Group
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Variable 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
Population (1,000s) 555.5 603.2 1.2 1.2 44.3 44.2 153.1 168.8 540.0 612.6 9126.1 9763.8
Total expenditures 
($millions) 2.352 3.020 0.148 0.017 0.187 0.220 0.625 0.800 2.198 2.844 40.004 49.339
Total revenue 
($millions) 2.444 3.176 0.158 0.019 0.191 0.238 0.629 0.807 2.209 3.045 43.388 54.194
Education share (%) 0.370 0.403 0.141 0.142 0.326 0.366 0.326 0.409 0.420 0.443 0.561 0.564
Health share (%) 0.113 0.106 0.011 0.026 0.055 0.061 0.088 0.081 0.143 0.156 0.376 0.314
Welfare share (%) 0.096 0.083 0.033 0.022 0.071 0.061 0.090 0.079 0.117 0.097 0.176 0.164
Police and fire 
protection share (%) 0.072 0.072 0.028 0.038 0.059 0.054 0.071 0.073 0.087 0.087 0.122 0.123
Infrastructure share (%) 0.348 0.336 0.225 0.234 0.290 0.281 0.347 0.328 0.398 0.379 0.594 0.527
Intergovernmental 
transfers share (%) 0.484 0.511 0.278 0.263 0.407 0.420 0.487 0.508 0.555 0.604 0.676 0.718
Taxes share (%) 0.516 0.489 0.324 0.282 0.445 0.396 0.513 0.492 0.593 0.580 0.722 0.737
Education per capita 
(1,000s) 1.633 2.098 0.904 1.004 1.380 1.787 1.583 2.018 1.877 2.377 2.648 3.972
Health per capita 
(1,000s) 0.581 0.627 0.046 0.126 0.213 0.272 0.370 0.377 0.641 0.785 2.976 2.551
Welfare per capita 
(1,000s) 0.424 0.434 0.210 0.183 0.310 0.295 0.427 0.378 0.523 0.535 0.879 1.131
Police and fire 
protection per capita 
(1,000s) 0.327 0.389 0.153 0.194 0.242 0.292 0.291 0.347 0.371 0.421 0.976 1.474
Infrastructure per capita 
(1,000s) 1.631 1.849 0.780 0.996 1.224 1.315 1.430 1.638 1.690 1.981 7.259 7.480
Total expenditures per 
capita (1,000s) 4.596 5.397 2.556 2.887 3.745 4.418 4.084 4.852 4.743 5.852 12.215 14.190
Taxes per capita 
(1,000s) 2.479 2.748 1.212 1.195 1.883 1.960 2.182 2.506 2.666 3.060 7.509 8.174
Intergov. transfers per 
capita (1,000s) 2.251 2.819 1.157 1.354 1.694 2.138 2.149 2.644 2.560 3.223 5.523 7.857
Total revenue per capita 
(1,000s) 4.730 5.567 2.692 3.075 3.791 4.419 4.157 4.970 4.890 6.101 13.033 16.031
Fraction of households 
in rural areas
Median household 
income ($10,000)
Fraction of population 
aged 0-20
Fraction of population 
aged 21-64
Fraction of population 
aged 65 and up 
Table F: Summary Statistics, California Counties in 2000
MaximumMean Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
County expenditure and revenue variables
Demographic variables (as of 1990)
0.319 0.000 0.089 0.474 1.000
4.290 2.752 3.473 4.090 5.148 7.434
0.199
0.689
0.304 0.173 0.275 0.984 0.340 0.390
0.570 0.515 0.542 0.568 0.587
Note:  All revenues and expenditure monetary values are in 2007 dollars, deflated by the CPI for all urban consumers in the United States.
0.126 0.732 0.099 0.123 0.153 0.194
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Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Education + $202 IG Transfers - $875
Police and Fire + $2,424 Own Taxes + $461
Infrastructure + $12,192
Total + $14,818 Total - $414
Young => middle-aged Education - $2,430 IG Transfers - $22
Police and Fire + $2,255 Own Taxes - $88
Infrastructure + $9,724
Total + $9,549 Total - $110
Young => old Education - $2,632 IG Transfers + $853
Welfare - $1,093 Own Taxes - $549
Police and Fire + $2,010
Total - $1,715 Total + $304
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table G: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California in 1990, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and 
Nechyba’s Method)
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Police and Fire + $2,143 IG Transfers + $284
Infrastructure + $15,820 Own Taxes - $8
Total + $17,963 Total + $276
Young => middle-aged Education - $3,390 IG Transfers + $175
Police and Fire + $1,517 Own Taxes - $840
Infrastructure + $7,408
Total + $5,535 Total - $665
Young => old Education - $6,487 IG Transfers - $109
Welfare + $1,395 Own Taxes - $832
Police and Fire - $626
Infrastructure - $8,412
Total - $14,130 Total - $941
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table H: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in California in 2000, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and 
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Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Education - $1,144 IG Transfers - $781
Health + $13,439 Own Taxes + $5,601
Police and Fire + $1,089
Total + $13,384 Total - $4,820
Young => middle-aged Education - $2,126 IG Transfers - $3,361
Infrastructure + $5,730 Own Taxes + $2,649
Total + $3,604 Total - $712
Young => old Infrastructure + 6,336 IG Transfers - $2,580
Own Taxes - $2,952
Total + 6,336 Total - $5,532
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table I: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population 
in California, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and Nechyba’s Method)
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Variable 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992
Population (1,000s) 77.4 81.4 0.1 0.1 10.5 10.5 22.2 22.6 53.0 56.3 8553.8 9021.9
Total expenditures 
($millions) 0.227 0.266 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.024 0.049 0.056 0.124 0.142 40.903 49.032
Total revenue 
($millions) 0.238 0.272 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.025 0.051 0.057 0.125 0.144 50.161 57.156
Education share (%) 0.522 0.526 0.000 0.000 0.439 0.443 0.522 0.522 0.606 0.610 0.999 0.999
Health share (%) 0.083 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.031 0.031 0.145 0.140 0.754 0.591
Welfare share (%) 0.024 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.036 0.038 0.227 0.282
Police and fire 
protection share (%) 0.053 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.037 0.049 0.052 0.066 0.070 0.366 0.352
Infrastructure share (%) 0.318 0.308 0.001 0.001 0.251 0.240 0.311 0.301 0.372 0.363 0.920 0.947
Intergovernmental 
transfers share (%) 0.435 0.437 0.012 0.000 0.333 0.336 0.433 0.432 0.539 0.534 0.907 0.897
Taxes share (%) 0.565 0.563 0.093 0.103 0.461 0.466 0.567 0.568 0.667 0.664 0.988 1.000
Education per capita 
(1,000s) 1.248 1.375 0.000 0.000 0.989 1.081 1.172 1.295 1.417 1.575 7.060 7.157
Health per capita 
(1,000s) 0.227 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.021 0.072 0.079 0.367 0.409 4.615 2.961
Welfare per capita 
(1,000s) 0.068 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.013 0.018 0.080 0.096 0.879 1.375
Police and fire 
protection per capita 
(1,000s) 0.132 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.089 0.113 0.132 0.162 0.188 1.437 1.238
Infrastructure per capita 
(1,000s) 0.834 0.887 0.001 0.001 0.491 0.520 0.714 0.756 1.005 1.070 16.504 12.178
Total expenditures per 
capita (1,000s) 2.509 2.760 0.218 0.247 1.836 1.990 2.295 2.530 2.932 3.258 17.941 14.381
Taxes per capita 
(1,000s) 1.533 1.646 0.116 0.106 0.916 1.007 1.354 1.470 1.871 2.014 13.184 24.512
Intergov. transfers per 
capita (1,000s) 1.051 1.146 0.095 0.000 0.770 0.846 0.960 1.039 1.210 1.332 5.128 5.676
Total revenue per capita 
(1,000s) 2.584 2.791 0.237 0.220 1.866 2.021 2.347 2.572 3.030 3.285 13.339 25.554
Fraction of households 
in rural areas
Median household 
income ($10,000)
Fraction of population 
aged 0-20
Fraction of population 
aged 21-64
Fraction of population 
aged 65 and up 
Table J: Summary Statistics, United States Counties in 1990 
Note:  All revenues and expenditure monetary values are in 2007 dollars, deflated by the CPI for all urban consumers in the United States.
0.149 0.015 0.121 0.146 0.174 0.340
0.768
0.311 0.179 0.290 0.307 0.330 0.555
0.539 0.387 0.514 0.539 0.562
1.000 1.000
2.384 0.860 1.964 2.267 2.680 5.928
0.659
County expenditure and revenue variables
Demographic variables (as of 1990)
0.636 0.000 0.423
MaximumMean Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
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Variable 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
Population (1,000s) 85.5 92.0 0.1 0.1 10.9 11.3 23.9 25.0 60.0 62.3 9126.1 9763.8
Total expenditures 
($millions) 0.298 0.362 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.032 0.650 0.074 0.167 0.202 52.215 61.454
Total revenue 
($millions) 0.307 0.362 0.001 0.001 0.029 0.032 0.066 0.074 0.169 0.202 59.279 61.454
Education share (%) 0.524 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.443 0.435 0.525 0.525 0.608 0.607 0.957 0.972
Health share (%) 0.083 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.029 0.027 0.120 0.119 0.645 0.628
Welfare share (%) 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.035 0.034 0.383 0.343
Police and fire 
protection share (%) 0.058 0.059 0.001 0.003 0.039 0.040 0.053 0.055 0.073 0.075 0.415 0.290
Infrastructure share (%) 0.312 0.313 0.039 0.022 0.244 0.249 0.304 0.306 0.365 0.366 0.915 0.931
Intergovernmental 
transfers share (%) 0.441 0.453 0.007 0.004 0.347 0.358 0.440 0.451 0.539 0.553 0.901 0.927
Taxes share (%) 0.559 0.547 0.099 0.073 0.461 0.447 0.560 0.549 0.653 0.642 0.993 0.996
Education per capita 
(1,000s) 1.508 1.666 0.000 0.000 1.206 1.330 1.414 1.563 1.698 1.884 10.449 7.994
Health per capita 
(1,000s) 0.297 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.023 0.080 0.084 0.390 0.415 5.316 5.201
Welfare per capita 
(1,000s) 0.080 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.015 0.098 0.109 2.391 2.870
Police and fire 
protection per capita 
(1,000s) 0.175 0.197 0.003 0.007 0.105 0.123 0.151 0.172 0.214 0.244 1.981 1.987
Infrastructure per capita 
(1,000s) 0.986 1.079 0.038 0.034 0.600 0.677 0.842 0.966 1.201 1.296 21.420 17.079
Total expenditures per 
capita (1,000s) 3.046 3.364 0.262 0.263 2.232 2.471 2.783 3.136 3.586 3.973 23.401 18.353
Taxes per capita 
(1,000s) 1.817 1.946 0.109 0.113 1.116 1.188 1.594 1.714 2.202 2.376 17.279 20.449
Intergov. transfers per 
capita (1,000s) 1.293 1.468 0.052 0.085 0.967 1.089 1.181 1.342 1.510 1.707 6.923 7.857
Total revenue per capita 
(1,000s) 3.110 3.413 0.304 0.319 2.275 2.489 2.842 3.143 3.633 3.978 17.535 20.536
Fraction of households 
in rural areas
Median household 
income ($10,000)
Fraction of population 
aged 0-20
Fraction of population 
aged 21-64
aged 65 and up 
Table J: Summary Statistics, United States Counties in 2000 
MaximumMean Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
County expenditure and revenue variables
Demographic variables (as of 1990)
0.604 0.000 0.362 0.910 1.000
3.526 1.270 2.960 3.367 3.920 8.293
0.612
0.758
0.296 0.173 0.276 0.295 0.315 0.518
0.555 0.422 0.533 0.557 0.578
Note:  All revenues and expenditure monetary values are in 2007 dollars, deflated by the CPI for all urban consumers in the United States.
0.148 0.018 0.122 0.144 0.171 0.347
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Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Education - $3,029 IG Transfers + $876
Health - $603 Own Taxes - $479
Welfare - $333
Police and Fire + $183
Infrastructure - $1,178
Total - $4,960 Total + $397
Young => middle-aged Education - $4,546 IG Transfers + $661
Health - $666 Own Taxes - $1,197
Police and Fire + $341
Infrastructure - $299
Total - $5,170 Total - $536
Young => old Education - $1,517 IG Transfers - $215
Welfare + $278 Own Taxes - $718
Police and Fire + $158
Infrastructure + $879
Total - $202 Total - $933
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table L: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population 
in the United States in 1990, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and Nechyba’s 
Method)
Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Education - $3,108 IG Transfers + $12
Health - $1,257 Own Taxes + $172
Welfare - $446
Police and Fire + $10
Infrastructure - $1,852
Total - $6,653 Total + $184
Young => middle-aged Education - $5,062 IG Transfers + $447
Health - $919 Own Taxes + $355
Police and Fire + $418
Infrastructure + $710
Total - $4,853 Total + $802
Young => old Education - $1,954 IG Transfers + $435
Welfare + $419 Own Taxes + $183
Police and Fire + $408
Infrastructure + $2,562
Total + $1,435 Total + $618
Effects on Expenditures Effects on Revenues
Table M: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s 
Population in the United States in 2000, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and 
Nechyba’s Method)
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Shift in Age Composition of 
Population
Old => middle-aged Health - $434 IG Transfers + $1,761
Police and Fire - $186 Own Taxes - $655
Infrastructure + $992
Total + $372 Total + $1,106
Young => middle-aged Education - $120 IG Transfers + $628
Health + $118 Own Taxes - $628
Police and Fire + $230
Infrastructure + $1,630
Total + $1,858 Total + $0 
Young => old Education - $344 IG Transfers - $1,133
Health + $552 Own Taxes + $27
Welfare - $229
Police and Fire + $416
Infrastructure + $611
Total + $1,006 Total - $1,106
Effects on RevenuesEffects on Expenditures
Table N: Budgetary Consequences of Changing the Age Composition of a County’s Population 
in the United States, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates (MaCurdy and Nechyba’s Method) 
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 Appendix II. Description of Data 
A. Revenue and Expenditure Data 
All revenue and expenditure data for California and Unites States counties in fiscal years 
1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 originate from the Census of Governments. The Census of 
Governments is a survey that is conducted by the U.S Bureau of the Census of Governments 
every five years. The data comes specifically from one publication of the Census of 
Governments, Volume 4 No. 5 Compendium of Government Finances. (An electronic copy of 
the data can be obtained by calling the Census of Governments office.) In this publication, 
revenues and expenditure information for every county in the United States is listed. The number 
of counties covered varies by survey year as new county boundaries are redrawn. The U.S. 
census Bureau lists 3,140 counties or county-equivalent units in the United States. In generating 
the data set for this study, counties in Hawaii and Alaska are eliminated. In addition, counties 
whose boundaries are redrawn or counties that were not in existence in 1897, 1992, 1997, and 
2002 are dismissed. Note that all government expenditure includes all capital outlay while 
revenue does not include receipts from borrowing. Debt, cash and securities of counties are not 
within the scope of this study. In addition, per capita expenditures and revenues figures are 
collected from the same source. They are labeled the same way as other variables except with the 
additional ending “_pc.” Below are details of the expenditure and revenue data obtained. Much 
of the data description is taken from the Appendix section of MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001). 
 
Direct General Expenditures 
 Total: Labeled with variable name “direct_general_expend” in the file received from the 
Census of Governments. Includes all expenditures such as payment to employees, suppliers, 
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 contractors, beneficiaries, and other final recipients of government payments. Excludes utility 
expenditure, liquor stores expenditure, employee-retirement, other insurance trust expenditure, 
and intergovernmental expenditure. 
 Education: Labeled as “total_educ_direct_exp” in the data file received. Includes 
expenditures for provision or support of schools and other educational facilities and services, 
including those for educational institutions beyond the high school level operated by local 
governments (e.g., community colleges). Covers such related services as pupil transportation, 
school milk, and lunch programs and other cafeterias, health and recreational programs, and the 
like. 
 Health and hospital: Labeled as “health___hosp_dir_exp” in the data file from the 
Census of Governments. Includes outpatient health services, including public health 
administration, research and education, treatment and immunization clinics, nursing, etc.; 
financing, construction, and operation of nursing homes; financing, construction, acquisition, 
maintenance, and operation of hospital facilities; provision of hospital care; and support of public 
or private hospitals.  
 Public welfare: Labeled as “public_welf_direct_exp.” Covers support of and assistance 
to needy persons contingent upon their needs. Includes Cash Assistance paid directly to needy 
persons under categorical (Old age Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Aid to 
the Blind, and Aid to the Disabled.) and other welfare programs; vendor payments made directly 
to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other commodities and services provided 
under welfare programs; welfare institutions; and any intergovernmental or other direct 
expenditure for welfare purposes. Pensions to former employees and other benefits not 
contingent on need are excluded. 
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  Police and fire protection: The sum of variables labeled as “police_prot_direct_exp” and 
“fire_prot_direct_exp” in the data file received. Includes expenditures for preservation of law 
and order and traffic safety. Covers police patrols and communications, crime prevention 
activities, detention and custody of persons awaiting trial, traffic safety, and vehicular inspection. 
Also covers fire-fighting organizations and auxiliary services, fire inspection and investigation, 
support of volunteer fire forces, and other fire prevention activities, including cost of fire-
fighting facilities, such as fire hydrants and water, furnished by other agencies of the government.   
 Infrastructure: This is a residual category created by subtracting the spending on each of 
the four expenditure categories from the total direct general expenditures. Represents 
expenditures that do not fall under the other four expenditure categories. This category covers 
expenditures on the general functions of government (legislative, as well as management and 
support); transportation (streets, highways, storm drains, street trees and landscaping, public 
transit, airports, ports and harbors); community development (planning, construction and 
engineering regulation enforcement, redevelopment, housing, employment, and community 
promotion); culture and leisure (parks recreation, marinas and wharfs, libraries, museums, golf 
courses, sports arenas and stadiums, community centers and auditoriums).   
  
General Revenue 
 Total: Labeled as “general_revenue.” Includes all revenue except utility, liquor stores, 
and employee-retirement or other insurance-trust revenue. All tax revenue and all 
intergovernmental revenue, even if designated for employee-retirement or local utility purposes, 
is classified as general revenue. 
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  Intergovernmental transfers: Labeled as “total_ig_revenue” in data file received. Covers 
amounts received from the federal or state government as fiscal aid, as reimbursements for 
performance of general government functions and specific services for the paying government, 
or in lieu of taxes. Excludes amounts received from other governments for sale of property, 
commodities, and utility services. All intergovernmental revenue is classified as general revenue. 
 Total taxes: Labeled as “gen_rev_own_sources.” Defined as all compulsory contributions 
exacted by a government for public purposes except employee and employer assessments for 
retirement and social insurance purposes, which as classified as insurance trust revenue. Total 
taxes include amounts received from all taxes imposed by a government. 
B. Demographic Data 
Data for explanatory variables are gathered from the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population 
STF3A files for United States counties, which can be found online at the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census website. Three age groups are constructed from the data: age 0 to 10, 21 to 64, and 65 
and older. The RURAL variable refers to the share of housing units in each county that are in 
rural (farm or nonfarm) areas. The median income variable consists of data of the median 
household income for each county, in tens of thousands of 1990 or 2000 dollars. 
 
** Note that all pecuniary values for revenues and expenditures are deflated to 1990 or 2007 
dollars using the CPI (all items) for urban consumers in the United States or the western region 
of the country. 
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